NOTES
What’s Wrong with ‘Global Justice’?

Global Justice, second edition, edited by Thomas W. Pogge (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); first published in Metaphilosophy volume 32, number 1/2 (2001). back

In his 1984 discussion of global justice, Kai Nielsen denies that the assumption of equal respect - in his terms "moral equality" - is adequate for underpinning distributive justice. He relies instead on what he calls fair cooperation. Moreover, unlike the global justice school, he sees capitalism as incompatible with global justice since it is incompatible with fair cooperation. In all these respects, Nielsen's approach is close to my own. See Kai Nielsen, "Global Justice, Capitalism, and the Third World," reprinted in his Globalization and Justice (Amherst NY: Humanity Books, 2003), chapter 6. back

Stefan Gosepath, "The Global Scope of Justice," in Global Justice, 148-149. back

See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), section 22. Gosepeth in his essay, "The Global Scope of Justice" (151-152), rejects the Rawlsian detour through cooperation and claims that equal respect and autonomy lead directly to a prima facie obligation for justice, understood as equal treatment. back

This lack of skepticism is evident in Wilfried Hinsch, "Global Distributive Justice," in Global Justice, 60, 70. back

One author, however, retreats from the emphasis on states and communities due to the fissures within them. He claims, instead, that non-state institutions create norms. Behind these institutions, he fails to recognize the role of movements in shaping norms. See Andrew Hurrell, "Global Inequality and International Institutions," in Global Justice, 33-40. back

One author appears to break with this assumption by saying that the "global economic order" - Does he mean capitalism? - has a tendency to prevent the ending of inequality. See Thomas W. Pogge, "Priorities of Global Justice," in Global Justice, 14. back

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), part III. back

Rainer Forst, "Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice," in Global Justice, 181-183. back

E.g., Wilfried Hinsch, "Global Distributive Justice," in Global Justice, 61. back

I am extending here the idea of David Hume that to apply the idea of justice there must be certain circumstances in society. See his Enquires Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777), section 3, part 1. Hume says a certain degree of order is necessary for justice to be respected. Rawls, as noted, turns this into a requirement of cooperation, which many authors in the global justice school build on. back

On the role of the economic context global justice, see Milton Fisk, The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Chapter 17 ("Global Justice"). back

Charles Beitz provides a refreshing break from the deontological approach when he studies empirically grounded reasons equality is valuable in his "Does Global Inequality Matter," in Global Justice, 107ff. back

The teleological approach that makes norms secondary to social goals is discussed in Milton Fisk, Toward a Healthy Society: The Morality and Politics of American Health Care Reform (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), chapter 6. back

An example of ignoring the fissure is the promotion of the potential of transnational corporations as enforcers of global justice by Onora O'Neill, "Agents of Justice." in Global Justice, 198-201. back

Andreas Follesdal, "Federal Inequality Among Equals: A Contractualist Defense," in Global Justice, 244-247. back

Rainer Forst, "Toward a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice," in Global Justice, 169. back

On this distinction between the two kinds of justice, see Fisk, The State and Justice, chapter 7. back